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DD/S&T# 2814-73

September 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: Major SCC Issues Regarding Procedures (U)

The attached paper identifies Agency representative views on the major issues regarding Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof for Strategic Offensive Arms.

The Agency representative views contained in the attached paper represent their views on the minimum acceptable outcomes of the major issues which could be negotiated by the SCC Commissioner without seeking additional guidance from Washington. The Agency representative views have not yet received internal review by the various Departments and Agencies.

A comprehensive discussion of all SCC Issues Regarding Procedures, U.S. and USSR approaches to each issue, the relevance of each to U.S. security interests, all alternative approaches to all issues, and the negotiability of each alternative is contained in the Memorandum on SCC Issues Regarding Procedures, dated August 17, 1973. That memorandum provides background information amplifying major issues discussed in the attached Issues Paper.

Attachment
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Executive Officer, U.S. Component
of the Standing Consultative Commission

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Verification Panel Working Group
SCC Working Group

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MAJOR SCC ISSUES REGARDING PROCEDURES

I. Purpose

This paper identifies the major issues and Agency representative views thereon in regard to the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof for Strategic Offensive Arms which require resolution prior to the second session of the SCC commencing on September 24, 1973.

II. Background

The major SCC Issues Regarding Procedures are related to the Joint Draft Texts (JDTs) agreed ad referendum to SCC Commissioners, dated July 4, 1973 (Attachment A). The bracketed portions of the JDTs indicate all the issues on which the sides did not reach agreement. The major issues discussed herein are keyed to the appropriate paragraphs of the attached JDTs.

III. Discussion of the Issues and Agency Representative Views Thereon

A. Issues Related to U.S. Proposals

1. Prior Notification

a. Background

NSDM-217 established requirements for notification one to six months prior to initiation of construction, dismantling, or destruction activities and sea trials. The USSR opposed any form of prior notification except on a voluntary basis.

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b. Relevance to U.S. Security

All Agency representatives agree that prior notification is not essential to assure adequate verification of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement, except in the event that either side might adopt one of the current U.S.-proposed destruction methods--sinking of a replaced submarine in international waters. In this case, verification of submarine sinking could not be guaranteed without prior notification of the date and place of sinking.

Prior notification is, however, considered by all Agency representatives to be desirable as a method of setting a precedent for more cooperative means of verification in future agreements wherein verification requirements may be more acute. Thus, it would be advantageous to secure as much Soviet movement as possible toward more liberal information exchanges in order to establish precedents which could enhance the effectiveness of national technical means and increase mutual confidence.

c. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Retain present U.S. position requiring prior notification.

Alternative b:

Modify U.S. prior notification proposal to require reporting only at regular SCC sessions, as in the USSR proposal, but require information concerning both past and future actions and future intentions.

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Alternative c:

The same approach as Alternative b but require at each regular SCC session only notification of the number of launchers for the specified past and future time periods.

Alternative d:

The same approach as Alternative c for dismantling or destruction activities but require only post notification of SSBN construction starts since the last SCC session.

Alternative e:

Require each party to report at each regular SCC session on the dismantling, destruction, and replacement activities initiated or completed since its last report to the SCC, including a statement on launchers and submarines to be replaced by new SSBN construction.

Alternative f:

Require notification no later than the initiation of dismantling or destruction and SSBN construction.

d. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives*

ACDA representative considers Alternatives c, d, and e to be acceptable.

CIA representative considers Alternatives c through f acceptable.

JCS and OSD representatives consider Alternatives a and b to be the minimum acceptable approaches.

*See basic Memorandum on SCC Issues Regarding SCC Procedures (pp.5-15) and Agency representative comments thereon for the pros and cons of pressing for prior notification.

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State representative finds Alternatives a through f acceptable (see his specific proposal for SSBN sinking option on p. 12).

2. Accumulation of SSBNs in a Construction Status

a. Background

The Interim Agreement (IA) did not limit the number of SSBNs either side may have under construction, despite efforts by the U.S. Delegation to achieve such a limit. Testimony given to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in favor of ratification of the IA did, however, commit the Administration to establish procedures in the SCC which would limit the number of SSBNs under construction. Thus, the issue is negotiation in the SCC of procedures which will honor this commitment to Congress to foreclose the possibility of the Soviets circumventing the intent of the IA by having an unreasonable number of SSBNs under construction at one time.

b. Relevance to U.S. Security

Assuming that the Soviets deactivate their 209 launchers for older ICBMs and the 30 launchers on H-class submarines, they could, by October 1977, have 62 submarines operational or on sea trials. In addition, assuming additional production facilities, they could have up to 20 submarines in construction halls and fitting out. Most, if not all, could become operational by 1980.

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It is possible that the Soviets may choose, in 1975, to launch and accumulate newly-constructed submarines which will not have begun sea trials, while legally retaining launchers for older ICBMs and SLBM launchers so as to give them a capability for rapid deployment of the stockpiled submarines at the expiration of the IA while still retaining the older ICBM and SLBM launchers.

Failure to negotiate SCC procedures limiting accumulation of SSBNs in a construction status could also have the effect of hardening congressional attitudes toward future U.S.-USSR agreements and/or making it more difficult to negotiate limits on SSBN construction in SALT TWO.

c. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Accept Guideline 8 of the JDT of the Protocol and strive for agreement in the bracketed portion of Para I, 7 of the Procedures on the number four (or another number to be negotiated) SSBNs which have been launched but have not begun sea trials. (A variation to the bracketed portion of Para I, 7, which would accomplish the same purpose, would be to obtain agreement that any number in excess of _____ SSBNs, which have been launched but have not begun sea trials, shall be considered as SSBNs which have begun sea trials).

Alternative b:

Accept Guideline 8 of the JDT of the Protocol and negotiate the following specific procedure: "The number of SSBNs which have been launched but have not yet begun sea trials, and the number of

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SLBM launchers on these SSBNs, shall not exceed 4 and 96, respectively."

(Note: Under this approach, the number of SLBM launchers could be in the range of 48-96).

d. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

CIA, JCS, and State representatives prefer Alternative a. State representative also believes that, if agreement cannot be reached on a reasonable number, the U.S. position on this issue should be re-examined.

ACDA representative also prefers Alternative a but would consider dropping it for concessions in other areas.

OSD representative considers Alternative b to be the minimum acceptable outcome.

3. Extent to which ICBM Launch-site Facilities (soft and silo) are to be Dismantled or Destroyed

a. Background

The present U.S. proposal as bracketed in the JDT would require the destruction of launch pads, silos, launch-control, propellant-storage, warhead-storage, and servicing bunkers, but would allow remaining facilities, including missile-ready buildings, to be used for other purposes after equipment is removed therefrom. The Soviet approach did not differentiate between procedures at soft and silo sites. Essentially, the USSR position requires removal of missiles, warheads, and mobile (including portable) equipment from launch sites and dismantling and removal of launch equipment. All site facilities could then be used "for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol."

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b. Relevance to U.S. Security

The U.S. approach is based on two important considerations: (1) that the procedures used result in verifiable physical evidence that dismantled or destroyed launchers are not usable to launch missiles, and (2) that they be rigorous enough to preclude reactivation of the sites in a period of time substantially less than that required to construct new sites.

Any residual facilities on soft SS-7 and SS-8 sites, particularly the missile-ready buildings, could be used by a mobile ICBM system if one were to be deployed by the USSR.

c. Alternative Approaches

1. Soft Sites

Alternative a:

Stand on present JDT position which would require dismantling and removal of missiles and equipment, dismantling or destruction of launch pads, launch-control, propellant-storage, warhead-storage, and servicing bunkers located at, or associated with, the launch site.

Alternative b:

Require dismantling and removal of missiles and equipment, dismantling or destruction of launch pads, launch control bunkers, and missile-ready buildings.

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Alternative c:

Same as Alternative b, but drop requirement to dismantle or destroy missile-ready buildings.

d. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

ACDA, CIA and State representatives find Alternative c acceptable.

OSD representative considers Alternative b to be the minimum acceptable procedure and would also amend the procedure to add the phrase "located at, or associated with, the launch site."

JCS representative considers Alternative a acceptable and would also amend it to add the requirement to dismantle or destroy the missile-ready buildings.

(2) Silo Sites

Alternative a:

Stand on present position in JDT which would require, in addition to removal of missiles and the dismantling and removal of equipment, that the following actions be performed: dismantling or destruction of silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, silo liners/ launch tubes, silo headworks and launch control bunkers. Dismantled components will be removed from the site. After six months the prior location of silos and bunkers may be covered with earth.

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Alternative b:

Same as Alternative a except that dismantling or destruction of launch control facility would not be required.

e. Agency Representative Views on Alternatives

ACDA and CIA representatives find Alternative b acceptable. All other Agency representatives consider Alternative a the minimum acceptable outcome.

4. Extent to which SLBM Launchers are to be Dismantled or Destroyed

a. Background

Both sides are agreed on the principle that each side should be able to select from among several methods for dismantling or destroying SLBM launchers.

The present U.S. position as contained in the JDT would permit three acceptable methods for dismantling or destroying SLBM launchers:

(1) Sinking in international waters; or (2) scrapping of the submarine and its launchers; or (3) removal of the submarine's missile section.

The Soviet proposed options are: (1) Removal of launch tubes and missile launching equipment from the submarine; or (2) cutting off the upper part of the tubes together with the superstructure above them.

b. Verification Considerations

Of the three U.S.-proposed options and two Soviet-proposed options, only sinking and scrapping would be verifiable at no risk.

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In view of the high probability that both sides will want to use dismantled SSBNs for "purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol," there is a need for additional SSBN dismantling or destruction procedures which are verifiable and which, at the same time, provide for use of the dismantled SSBN "for other purposes."

c. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Stand on the three U.S. options bracketed in the JDT. Under the third option the missile section of the SSBN must be removed and replacement of this section with a new section of any substantial size must be precluded. Then the two ends of the submarine would be mated (if possible) and the submarine could be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

Alternative b:

The following variation of the Soviet proposals might be considered together with the three U.S. JDT options:

Removal of the launch tubes* the missile launching equipment, and the superstructure above the launch tubes. Replacement of the entire upper portion of the missile compartment pressure hull with pressure hull containing no launch tube penetrations. These procedures shall be accomplished in the open at predesignated shipyards.

*It must be made clear that the launch tube is defined as the pressure-resistant, watertight structural tube that is welded to the pressure hull.

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Alternative c: (Procedures applicable to Y-class and Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs only):*

The following variation of the Soviet proposals might be considered for up to 10 SSBNs and up to 160 SLBM launchers:

Removal of the launch tubes above the hull, the missiles, missile-launching equipment, and the superstructure above the pressure hull. The party performing this procedure would not be allowed (a) to lower the launch tube to lengthen it or (b) to test or to have tested an SLBM which could fit within the reduced launch tube. These procedures shall be accomplished in the open at predesignated shipyards.

Alternative d: (Procedures applicable to H-class SSBNs only):

Cut off the launch mount tubes above the pressure hull, as well as the superstructure covering them.

Alternative e:

A variation of Alternative a which would drop sinking in international waters as one of the permitted options, if the Soviets do not agree to prior notification for that option.

d. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

All Agency representatives find Alternative a acceptable. The OSD representative would, however, drop sinking as a permitted option. The ACDA and CIA representatives consider Alternative e also acceptable.

*Alternative c is provided in the event that the U.S. Government decides to retain the option of placing SLCMs in replaced Polaris submarines.

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The State representative also finds Alternative b acceptable. As noted above (page 4), he would also recommend that an attempt be made to gain agreement on the sinking option because of its precedent-setting feature of prior notification.

The OSD and CIA representatives would accept Alternative d for H-class submarines only.

B. Issues Related to USSR Proposals

1. Codification of the Right to Use Dismantled ICBM Facilities and SSBNs

a. Background

The Soviet side has insisted that dismantling procedures should permit the use of dismantled ICBM facilities and SSBNs for purposes (including "non-strategic" military purposes) not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol. The U.S. and Soviet-proposed formulations for codification of this right contained in Guideline 6 and Paragraph II, 4, of the Procedures reflect the differences between the sides on the extent to which dismantling of ICBM facilities should be accomplished. Agreement on the formulation of the two paragraphs can probably be reached to reflect the Procedures agreed to in the SCC.

b. Relevance to U.S. Security

From the national security aspect, the U.S. would have no objection to the use of dismantled ICBM facilities or SSBNs for other non-strategic military uses. There are, however, political and military reasons which could argue that:

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(1) dismantled ICBM facilities not be used for

(a) fixed or mobile MR/IRBMs targeted on U.S.

Allies and/or

(b) mobile ICBMs

(2) dismantled SSBNs not be refitted with ballistic missile launchers of any type.

c. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Refuse to include any provision codifying the right to use residual dismantled ICBM facilities or SSBNs for any military purposes.

Alternative b:

Stand on the present U.S.-proposed wording.

Alternative c:

Accept codification of the right but amend the U.S. formulation to include a prohibition on the use of dismantled ICBM facilities and/or SSBNs for the support, storage, or launch of any ballistic missiles.

d. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

ACDA and OSD representatives find Alternative c acceptable.

CIA and State representatives find Alternative b acceptable.

JCS representative considers Alternative a acceptable.

2. Should the U.S. attempt to close the loophole in the Interim Agreement whereby launchers for new SLBMs, which are not "modern SLBMs" as presently defined, can be deployed on diesel submarines without being counted?

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a. Background and Effect

Subsequent to the June 17, 1972, Approved Interpretation and July 24, 1972, Clarification, the limit on SLBM launchers has a loophole:

- (1) launchers for new SLBMs deployed only on diesel submarines are not included in the 710 and 970 launcher limits, and
- (2) an existing ballistic missile launcher need not be dismantled or destroyed for each launcher for a new SLBM on a diesel submarine.

b. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Accept Para I, 1 and 2, as agreed ad referendum to Commissioners, thus leaving the loophole open.

Alternative b:

Add to Para I, 2, the following:

"In addition, all SLBMs first tested after 1964 are modern SLBMs."

c. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

ACDA and State representatives find Alternative a acceptable, but believe that the problem of the loophole should be addressed further per Agency comments on the basic Memorandum on SCC Issues.

CIA, JCS, and OSD representatives find Alternative b acceptable.

3. How should land-based missiles which can be replaced by modern SLBMs be specified?

a. Background

The IA provides that only launchers of "older types deployed prior to 1964" can be replaced by modern SLBMs. The negotiating record clearly delineates such launchers as being the 209 SS-7 and SS-8 Soviet

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launchers and the 54 U.S. Titan II launchers. The U.S., as of September 1, 1973, has approximately 170 MM-I launchers which are of an "older type deployed prior to 1964." Thus, the language of the IA would, if interpreted literally, permit replacement of MM-I launchers, as well as the 54 Titan II launchers, by modern SLBMs, even though the U.S. has no current plans to replace any ICBM launchers by SLBM launchers during the life of the IA.

b. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Accept Guideline 1 which leaves the ambiguity as to which type of launchers the U.S. can replace with SLBM launchers.

Alternative b:

Notify the Soviet side that the U.S. has the right to use up to 54 MM-I for replacement purposes, while retaining Titan IIs. If the Soviets object, the U.S. would then clarify to the Soviet side that "older types" means "heavy missiles," i.e., Titan IIs for the U.S. and SS-7s and SS-8s for the USSR, thereby forcing Soviet admission that a missile with a 125m³ volume is a heavy missile. It is recalled that the USSR refused to agree to a common definition of a "heavy" missile in SALT ONE.

c. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

ACDA, CIA, JCS, and State representatives believe Alternative a should be adopted (see Agency comments on basic paper).

The OSD representative believes that Alternative b should be adopted.

C. General Issues

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Background

The Agreed Procedures will be in the form of a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and USSR. Other SALT agreements, except for the exchanges resulting in the June 17, 1972, White House "Approved Interpretation" and the July 24, 1972, "Agreed Clarification," have been made public, despite Soviet opposition to publication of certain elements. However, those made public have not gone into such specificity as do the U.S.-proposed detailed procedures.

Relevance to U.S. Security

The issue may or may not be relevant to U.S. security. Considerations favoring publication include Congressional, NATO, and public aversion to "secret agreements," the publication of most previous SALT agreements, and the fact that the U. S. could, if the need arose, make a more effective public case in the future on charges of Soviet violations of the IA by showing which specific procedures were violated.

Considerations against publication include concern that publication could jeopardize future SCC negotiations and make the USSR less willing to agree to the specificity the U.S. deems necessary for implementing current and future agreements. This would reduce the SCC's authority and effectiveness. It could also lead to protracted public debate over the degree of Soviet compliance with the agreements.

(Note: Whether or not the Procedures are made public, we would provide the relevant congressional committees with classified versions of the procedures, as required by the Case Act of 1972, and could provide NATO with a classified report as well).

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c. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

ACDA and CIA representatives believe that the Procedures should not be published.

JCS and OSD representatives favor publication.

State representative has no position but believes the issue should be flagged for the Verification Panel.

2. Provision for Voluntary Information

a. Background

Section I, paragraph 13, contains the following unbracketed language which may represent the limit of Soviet willingness to consider any notification other than after-the-fact notification:

"Each side may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement."

b. Alternative Approaches

Alternative a:

Retain the present formulation.

Alternative b:

Amend the Soviet-proposed paragraph by inserting the words:

"and may offer on-site inspection of dismantled or destroyed launchers and SSBNs" between the words "notifications" and "if."

c. Agency Representative Views on the Alternatives

CIA, JCS, and State representatives believe that Alternative a should be adopted.

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ACDA and OSD representatives believe that Alternative b should be adopted. ACDA representative believes that, if this Alternative proves non-negotiable, the U.S. Commissioner should reiterate that an offer of OSI is not precluded by the present JDT language.

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Attachment A

Joint Draft Text

Ad referendum to SCC Commissioners
July 4, 1973

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to the provisions of the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, agreed upon, in the form attached, procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement.

The Parties have also agreed to be guided by the following general guidelines:

1. The attached procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed under the provisions of the aforementioned Interim Agreement;

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2. Any replacement of ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers and submarines shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers shall ensure that the launchers and associated facilities would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, respectively; [dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means, shall be such that reactivation time of such units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction, and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;⁷¹

4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be considered separately for [soft and silo]⁷¹ land-based ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and submarines;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that verification can be accomplished [with high confidence]⁷¹ by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

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6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached procedures, the facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and the submarines,⁷¹ Facilities at land-based ICBM launch sites, after dismantling of the equipment, and submarines, after dismantling of the launchers,⁷² may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;

7. Replacement launchers and those to be replaced shall be identified and the number of such launchers specified through appropriate and timely notification procedures; and⁷¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled launchers and the number of such launchers used for replacement; and⁷²

8. The number of replacement ballistic missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule.

This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

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Done in Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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Joint Draft Text

Ad referendum to SCC Commissioners
July 4, 1973

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for both sides, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964, ballistic missile launchers on any nuclear-powered submarines, and modern ballistic missile launchers on diesel submarines may be replaced by ballistic missile launchers on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are understood to be: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines which have become operational since 1965.

3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for replacement purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

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4. Within the limitations provided for in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto, replacement shall be carried out on the basis of one new launcher for one older launcher and one new submarine for one submarine being replaced.⁷²

5. Each side shall notify the other side one month prior to the date on which construction is initiated of the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) containing the ballistic missile launchers additional to the number agreed in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement. For the US this will be the nuclear submarine containing the 657th ballistic missile launcher; for the USSR this will be the nuclear submarine containing the 741st ballistic missile launcher. Similar notification shall be given for each subsequent replacement SSBN. It is understood that construction of an SSBN is initiated on the date on which SSBN assembly begins on the building ways or in an SSBN construction hall.⁷¹

6. The older types of ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 or ballistic missile launchers on older submarines, subject to dismantling or destruction, shall be identified by type (hard ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher) no later than six months before the beginning of sea trials of the replacement submarine.⁷¹

¹Proposed by US side.

7. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. 7¹ The number of SSBNs which have been launched but have not yet begun sea trials shall not exceed four. 7¹ The initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall be considered as the initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. The initiation of any of the actions in Section III, below shall be considered as the initiation of dismantling or destruction of an SSBM launcher.

8. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine is considered to be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

9. The specific geographic location and the time of the planned dismantling or destruction activity shall be identified no later than one month prior to the initiation of the action. 7¹

10. Notification that dismantling or destruction has been accomplished shall be given no later than one month after completion. 7¹

11. Notification of the dismantling of ICBM launchers and ballistic missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission. 7²

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12. The notification shall contain information for the past six months on the number of dismantled ICBM launchers and ballistic missile launchers on replaced submarines, as well as on the number of such launchers replaced by launchers on modern submarines during that period.⁷²

13. Each side may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. Removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment; dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant handling equipment, 1 located at or associated with the launch site;⁷¹ 2 associated with the launcher and located at the launch site;⁷² and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

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2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in para. 1, the following actions shall be performed: dismantling or destruction of launch pads, launch control bunkers, propellant storage bunkers, and warhead storage and servicing bunkers located at or associated with the launch site. Launch pad and bunker debris may be removed and after six months its prior location covered with earth.¹

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in para. 1, the following actions shall be performed: removal from the site, dismantling, or destruction of silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, silo liners/launch tubes, silo headworks, and launch control bunkers. After six months the prior locations of silos and bunkers may be covered with earth.¹

4. Facilities remaining¹ at ICBM launch sites, after removal of equipment and facilities from the site, or their dismantling or destruction¹ dismantling of equipment² in accordance with the above procedures, may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed within four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

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III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of SLBM Submarines and Launchers Replaced by New SLBM Submarines and Launchers

1. The following procedures, from which each side may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of SLBM submarines and launchers:

[a] Sinking of the SLBM submarine with its launchers in international waters of at least 2000 meters depth.

(b) Scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the open in predesignated shipyards. Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly.

(c) Removing the submarine's missile section in the open in predesignated shipyards.⁷¹

[d] Removal of launch tubes and missile launching equipment from the submarine.

(e) Cutting off the upper part of the tubes together with the superstructure above them.⁷²

2. Each of the foregoing shall be accomplished within six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

3. Under any dismantling option, launch tube hatches shall

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IV. Procedures for Replacement of an SSBN Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

☐ In the event that a submarine is accidentally lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be replaced by another submarine in accordance with the following:

☒ (a) Notification of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other side.⁷¹

☒ (b) Notification of intent to provide a replacement submarine shall be given at least one month prior to initiation of implementing actions.⁷¹

(c) The number of launchers on the replacement submarine shall not cause the total to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement.

(d) The disabled SSBN shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these procedures.

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Joint Draft Text
Ad referendum to SCC Com
July 4, 1973

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

Pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, agreed upon, in the form attached, procedures governing replacement dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty.

The Parties have also agreed to be guided by the following general guidelines:

1. The attached procedures shall apply only to systems or the components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed under the provisions of the aforementioned Treaty;

2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or the

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components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components, resulting from implementing Article VII and Article VIII of the aforementioned ABM Treaty shall ensure that the systems or components and associated facilities would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; [dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means, shall be such that reactivation time of such units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction, and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling and destruction;¹

4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be considered separately for [soft and silo]¹ ABM launchers and for ABM radars;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that verification can be accomplished [with high confidence]¹ by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the aforementioned Treaty;

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6. Facilities remaining at ABM launch and radar sites, after dismantling or destruction, 7¹ related to dismantled or destroyed ABM systems, after dismantling of equipment, 7² may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and

7. Replacement launchers and radars and those to be replaced shall be identified and the number of such launchers and radars specified through appropriate and timely notification procedures. 7¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed ABM systems or their individual components, and the number of such ABM systems or their components used for replacement. 7²

This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done in Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

A. Above-ground launchers shall be removed from sites and launch pads shall be fragmented.

1. Launch pad debris shall be left exposed for a period of six additional months, after which debris may be removed or covered with earth.

B. Launch silos shall be made unusable by removal of launcher rails, wiring and other hardware and by destruction of above ground structural features and fragmentation of foundations.

1. Destroyed silos shall be left open for a period of six additional months, after which craters may be filled with earth.

C. The actions described in paragraphs IA and IB shall be accomplished within three months after initial notification.

D. Notification procedures shall include:

1. Initial notification of the launcher to be dismantled.
2. Notification within one month after completion that dismantling has been accomplished.

II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

A. Metal reinforcing rods on the radar buildings shall be cut off.

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B. Those radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their present uncompleted state for six months after which they may be covered with earth.

C. Launcher facilities and those radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.

D. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials shall be removed.

E. Dismantling activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement by the SCC on the relevant procedures

F. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given one month after completion.¹

¹Proposed by US side.

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